

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF THEATER COMBAT OPERATIONS UNDER UNIFIED COMBATANT COMMAND

by

W. Keith Fantroy
Captain, Supply Corps, U. S. Navy

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

W. KEITH FANTROY

19 June 1992

Paper directed by Captain H. Ward Clark
Chairman, Department of Military Operations
Colonel Randall E. Heim, USA, Faculty
Planning and Decision Making Division, Operations Department

Approved by:

RANDALL E. HEIM — DATE 5/18/92

UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	1b RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY	3 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE	
4 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)
6a NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT 6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) C	7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) NAVAL WAR COLLEGE NEWPORT, R.I. 02841	7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION 8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)	10 SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS PROGRAM ELEMENT NO. / PROJECT NO. / TASK NO / WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.

11. TITLE (Include Security Classification)
LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF THEATER COMBAT OPERATIONS UNDER UNIFIED COMBATANT COMMAND (U)

12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) FANTROY, WARD K., CAPTAIN, SUPPLY CORPS, USN

13a. TYPE OF REPORT	13b TIME COVERED	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day)	15 PAGE COUNT
FINAL	FROM ____ TO ____	19 JUNE 1992	29

16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

17 COSATI CODES		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP

18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
CONCEPTS, METHODS AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THEATER LOGISTIC SUPPORT: INTEGRATED THEATER LOGISTIC SUPPORT

19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

One of the greatest challenges facing the unified combatant commander is garnering the wherewithal to maximally sustain combat effectiveness in the theater of operations in wartime. The collapse of the Soviet Union, our inability to specifiy the next threat, declining military budgets and reductions in force structure have combined to highlight the necessity to be able to operate more efficiently with less and do so in a responsive and effective fashion. Each Service component provides the CINC multiple logistic support capabilities. However, when employed simultaneously, these capabilities will often overlap or be duplicitous in nature if not properly integrated and coordinated. The CINC must therefore reorganize assigned logistic support forces and redirect available resources to ensure the most effective organization is in being, ready and able to smoothly transition from a peacetime to a wartime footing within the prescribed time frame. The advent of scarce resources and uncertainty requires a rethinking and adjustment of DOD organizational, operational, and funding policies applicable to combatant commanders in order to provide the CINC the authority required to effect the necessary changes.

20 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT	21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
☒ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT ☐ DTIC USERS	UNCLASSIFIED
22a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL CHAIRMAN, OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT	22b TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 841-3414 / 22c. OFFICE SYMBOL C

DD FORM 1473, 84 MAR — 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted. All other editions are obsolete.

UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

0102-LF-014-6602

Abstract of
LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF THEATER COMBAT OPERATIONS
UNDER UNIFIED COMBATANT COMMAND

One of the greatest challenges facing the unified combatant commander is garnering the wherewithal to maximally sustain combat effectiveness in the theater of operations in wartime. The collapse of the Soviet Union, our inability to specify the next threat, declining military budgets and reductions in force structure have combined to highlight the necessity to be able to operate more efficiently with less and do so in a responsive and effective fashion. Each Service component provides the CINC multiple logistic support capabilities. However, when employed simultaneously, these capabilities will often overlap or be duplicitous in nature if not properly integrated and coordinated. The CINC must therefore reorganize assigned logistic support forces and redirect available resources to ensure the most effective organization is in being, ready and able to smoothly transition from a peacetime to a wartime footing within the prescribed time frame. The advent of scarce resources and uncertainty requires a rethinking and adjustment of Department of Defense organizational, operational, and funding policies applicable to combatant commanders in order to provide the CINC the authority required to effect the necessary changes.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

When supporting combat operations, logisticians often operate under the apprehension of Benjamin Franklin's well used maxim:

> "For want of a nail, the shoe was lost--
> for want of a shoe, the horse was lost--
> for want of a horse, the rider was lost--
> for want of a rider, the battle was lost."

Today, logisticians are tasked with supporting military forces operating technologically more advanced, vastly mechanized weapons, weapon systems, and equipments. Although the end product differs substantially, the principle uneasiness attendant to having that synonymous "nail" at the right place, at the right time, and in the right quantity still plagues logisticians.

One of the greatest challenges facing the unified combatant commander--hereafter referred to as "commander-in-chief" or "CINC"--is how to maximize theater logistic support during combat operations. This must be accomplished in a manner that (1) avoids detrimental constraints on warfighting capacity in terms of flexibility, mobility, and sustainability, and (2) avoids overburdening or inefficient use of available logistic support assets. The advent of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm highlighted several logistic support deficiencies requiring corrective action in unified organization and operations. A part of the corrective action is a greater reliance on common-service, cross-service, and joint logistic support and the minimization of

reliance on uniservice support. These components of integrated logistic support are as critical to improving the effectiveness of joint operations as are integration and unity of effort of tactical combatants in unified commands. The CINC must act now to correct organizational, command, and administrative relationships of these logistic support force components in order to create the adaptable and flexible force structure required to meet new threat contingencies. It is the enhancement of the CINC's ability to integrate and exercise these components of logistic support during peacetime operations that will most influence the effectiveness of corrective actions taken.

CHAPTER II

CONCEPTS, METHODS AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THEATER LOGISTIC SUPPORT

GENERAL DISCUSSION. "Logistics is the provision of the physical means by which power is exercised by organized forces. In military terms, it is the creation and sustained support of combat forces and weapons. Its objective is maximum sustained combat effectiveness."[1] Joint logistic support of unified combat operations entails the provision of the means of war to joint combat forces by single Service activities or to single Service combat forces through joint Service activities. In other words, the sourcing of support may be achieved through single Service internal support of requirements, or through common-servicing, cross-servicing, or joint-servicing of unified command needs across Services. Whatever the source of the support, "...all measures affecting the control and coordination of logistics must be judged by their effect on sustained combat effectiveness under war conditions...."[2] This is only one of several principles of logistic support which include among them: responsiveness and foresight, flexibility, economy, attainability, sustainability or self-sufficiency, simplicity, cooperation, and survivability.[3]

LOGISTIC SUPPORT FUNCTIONS. The functions of logistic support consist of supply, transportation, maintenance, engineering, and support services. The functions of supply provide for the procurement, receipt, storage and management (in-custody control, accounting, care and issue) of materiel required for combat and support operations. Supply functions also provide for the procurement

of non-organic support services as well as for reclamation and disposal of government property. Transportation functions involve movement and traffic management (by sea, air and/or ground) of combat and support resources (people, equipment, supplies, etc.) between designated points and the management and operation of transport equipment and facilities. Maintenance functions provide for general upkeep, repair, modification and/or upgrade of weapons, weapon systems, equipment, and components and the management of custodied retrograde property. Engineering support functions provide for design, construction, maintenance, destruction and/or removal of facilities and structures. Support services functions provide for management, administration, comfort, care, and the general welfare of people.

The functions described above apply equally, though differently, to each of the three levels of war (strategic, operational, and tactical). Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm brought to the fore the logistic difficulties the CINC faces during wartime operations. "Under conditions short of crisis or war, CINCs are authorized to exercise directive authority over logistic operations within their areas of responsibility (AOR). ...The CINCs directive authority over logistic operations does not release the Services from their responsibility to man, equip, train, and sustain their Service components. ...Under wartime or crisis conditions, or when critical situations mandate diversion from the normal logistic process, this authority is expanded to authorize combatant commanders to use all necessary facilities and logistic resources for the accomplishment of

their missions.[4] It is this difference between peacetime and wartime operations wherein much of the CINC's difficulties arise--more on this point later.

The CINC is primarily concerned with operational level logistic support--those activities and functions of theater logistic support that start where strategic logistic support ends and stops where organic, tactical logistical support begins. However, it is the CINC's deftness in linking the three levels of support during operations planning, in interfacing them during execution, and in maintaining cognizance of logistic support principles during both that will best ensure achievement of the primary logistic support objective--maximum sustained combat effectiveness.

UNIFIED COMBATANT COMMANDER'S CONTRIBUTION. The CINC exercises his authority in crisis or war to give "authoritative direction to subordinate commands, including all aspects of military operations...and logistics; ...organize commands and forces to carry out assigned missions; (and) coordinate and approve administration (and) support...."[5] Further, the CINC exercises his directive authority for logistics under wartime conditions "to use all facilities and supplies of all forces assigned (to the command) as necessary, for the accomplishment of (the) missions...under the approved war plan being implemented. A CINC will exercise approval authority over Service logistic programs (base adjustments, force beddowns, etc.) within the area of responsibility that will have significant effects on his operational capability or sustainability.[6] Using this authority, the CINC determines

"...those major logistic tasks affecting the joint force as a whole which can best be decentralized among the Service components and those that must be consolidated under one Service component for centralized direction."[7]

The CINC provides a logistic concept which "...complements the strategic or operational concept and its priorities and provides a broad statement of how the joint force as a whole is to be supported. The logistic concept...supports changes in the concept of operations or anticipated enemy action. The strategic or operational concept may stretch but must not break the concept for logistics."[8] This logistic concept considers such things as: logistic authority (how work is divided between the CINC and Service component commanders); logistic network (assignment of work among the component commanders); control of logistic flow (establishment and control of pipeline input/output to, from, between, and within the theater and objective); improvisation and forage (making use of resources available, including host nation support, captured resources, etc.); and timing (pacing operations with logistic support and vice versa).[9] Having provided the concept for logistics and approved the logistic plan, the CINC relies on each Service component commander to exercise assigned logistic support responsibilities. The adequacy of Service component plans to support the CINC is a matter between the CINC and subordinate Service component commanders. Problems that cannot be resolved satisfactorily may be referred to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for resolution.

Prior to approval, the CINC tests the plan to ensure it: (1)

accomplishes the objective; (2) is simple and is consistent with the objective; (3) responds to foreseeable requirements for the period of the contemplated operation; (4) uses existing resources first, then, if necessary, seeks new resources; (5) creates an effective organization with clearly established relationships and responsibilities; (6) permits coordination during execution by means of direct contact between support and supported organizations; (7) provides for adequate means of supervision and subsequent amendment; (8) is based on recent and relevant facts; (9) is flexible enough to permit modification during execution; and (10) provides for the identification of shortfalls. In this plan, the CINC may also require component commanders to provide support to allied and/or coalition commands.[10] The CINC ensures the plan identifies the materiel, facilities, and services needed; who is responsible for providing them; and how, when, and where they will be provided. This is where the CINC covers such details as supply and distribution; maintenance; medical services; mobility and transportation (sealift, airlift, fleet support, and forces ashore); base development and other engineering support; personnel (including own forces, civilians, indigenous labor, prisoners of war, evacuees, and repatriates); foreign military assistance and host nation support; as well as such things as finance, legal, civil affairs, etc.[11]

SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDER'S CONTRIBUTION. Subject to the CINC's exercise of directive authority for logistics, "the operating details of any Service logistic support system will be retained and exercised by the Service component commanders in accordance with

instructions of their Military Departments....[12] In conjunction, the component commander must inform the CINC of plans to change logistic support that would significantly affect the CINC's operational capability or sustainability in order to obtain approval. In wartime where critical situations make diversion of the normal logistic process necessary, Service component commanders will implement directives issued by the CINC.[13]

There are unique or essential logistic support requirements that each Service component provides to its own forces. This service is sometimes referred to as "uniservice support." Uniservice support often eliminates the need for additional headquarters which are required in joint efforts but often results in some duplication of efforts and will likely require a control agency in CINC headquarters. In conjunction, there are various requirements across and/or between Service components that can best be met through common-service support, joint-service support, or cross-service support functions. Common-service support provides support to another Service for which no reimbursement is required from the receiving Service(s). For example, ocean terminal operations or supply depot subsistence operations may be operated by a single Service but provides pertinent common services to other Services in the area. The Service component providing this service may have units from other Services assigned. This type of service should not be confused with the common user services provided by the U. S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) through Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and Military Airlift Command (MAC) which are

reimbursable services. Joint-service support is provided through functions performed by a jointly staffed and financed activity established in support of two or more military Services. Examples include the Joint Petroleum Office (JPO), Joint Graves Registration Office (JGRO), Joint Medical Regulating Office (JMRO), and Joint Transportation Board (JTB). Cross-service support is like common-service support except that the receiving Service(s) must provide reimbursement for the services rendered, i.e., the provision of air and/or ground fuel or refueling services by one Service to other Services. The discussion below is not all inclusive, but should give the reader some idea of the extent to which Service component commands depend on themselves and others for logistic support during theater combat operations.

U.S. Army Component. The U.S. Army Component Commander (USACC) operates the Army-in-the-field segment of the Army Logistics System. This segment consists primarily of those Combat Service Support (CSS) units which are organic to operating forces. Current U.S. Army (USA) doctrine attempts to establish a system which is flexible enough to be tailored to any given theater but which insures that logistical functions are provided in the degree required. In some conflicts, the theater of operations may be relatively small. In such cases, the Army component may consist of a single corps or a smaller force. The corps is the largest Army combat organization capable of sustained administrative, logistical and tactical operations. The corps directs the combat operations of its assigned divisions and provides them with CSS to sustain tactical operations. The doctrinal concepts of

organization, mission, and functions are applicable to the smaller theater, modified as necessary to satisfy its requirements. When a corps is the major Army component of a theater, its Corps Support Command (COSCOM) will be tailored to provide the Theater Army (TA) base activities normally provided by the major functional and area commands to TA, unless otherwise provided for.[14]

The TA commander retains overall control of CSS operations to insure uniformity of the support effort in the combat zone. TA logistic commands consist of: Medical Command (MEDCOM), Personnel Command (PERSCOM), Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), Engineer Command (ENCOM), and Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM). The Theater Communications Command, Army (TCC,A) and Civil Affairs (CA) Command provides support as required.

TA directs, coordinates and provides, through PERSCOM, general support (GS) personnel, financial, administrative, morale (chaplain and recreation), and internment (prisoner of war and civilian internee) services to the theater. It also provides, through MEDCOM, medical support within the theater. It provides, through TAACOM, limited GS backup supply and maintenance to the corps, GS/direct support (DS) supply and maintenance, and DS personnel, financial, and other services to units passing through the theater and to other forces as directed. The TA provides, through TRANSCOM, Army transportation services to the theater and provides transportation CSS for staff transportation, management of movements, and mode operations. ENCOM provides general troop and contractual construction support and real property maintenance activities (RPMA) to the Army

and to other Services and allies within the theater as directed.[15]

Through the functions described above, the USA may provide any of the following logistic support to other Services (non-conclusive): ground transportation; sea terminal operation support and security (includes lighterage boats, offload/onload of cargo, and other cargo traffic management activities); subsistence management; water production, purification, storage and distribution; ammunition management; fuels management; facilities construction and demolition; petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) management and distribution; management of prisoners of war and other internees; medical evacuation and care; veterinary services; graves registration services; etc.

U. S. Air Force Component. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) field organization is made up of major commands, separate operating agencies, and direct reporting units. The major commands are organized on a functional basis in the United States (US) and on an area basis overseas. Functionally organized commands include combat commands and support commands. Three of these combat support commands are the Tactical Air Command (TAC), Strategic Air Command (SAC), and the Military Airlift Command (MAC). These combat support commands are undergoing reorganization at this time whereby the non-strategic arms of SAC will be combined with TAC and MAC into the USAF Air Combat Command (USAFACC) and Air Mobility Command (AMC). This reorganization is planned for completion in June 1992. Area commands include the Alaskan Air Command (AAC), Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), and the USAF in Europe (USAFE). In its logistic support role, AMC will be the USAF tanker manager responsible for supporting not only USAF aircraft, but

also those of the U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC). The term "Tactical Air Forces" (TAF) refers to USAF tactical fighter, reconnaissance, airlift, special operations, and command and control units organized, equipped and trained to conduct tactical air operations. These forces are deployed worldwide, principally in four major air commands: USAFACC, AMC, USAFE, and PACAF. To accomplish their logistic support missions, tactical air forces provide tactical airlift and special air operations as the CINC directs.[16]

As a major command, the USAFACC will organize, train, and equip tactical air forces for operational assignment to unified commands. Stated concisely, USAFACC's mission will be to provide fast-reaching, combat-ready tactical air forces for employment anywhere in the world independently or in concert with other air, land, or sea forces. PACAF and USAFE Air Force components of unified commands overseas conduct training similar to USAFACC, but both are tailored to the unique problems and tactics of air operations in that part of the world to which they are assigned.

AMC will be a component command of USTRANSCOM. A part of AMC's mission will be to provide tactical airlift support within theater.[17] AMC will be the single manager operating agency for airlift service with the primary mission to provide airlift support to all Department of Defense (DOD) Services during crisis or war. In carrying out this mission, AMC will provide airlift for deploying or employing large segments of the Armed Forces, sustaining logistic resupply of those forces, and evacuating the wounded and ill. It is a continuum that starts with deployment of forces and continues with the forward

projection of those forces to and within combat or other objective areas by air or airdrop. Centralized control of airlift resources permits coordinated response to a CINC's requirements to insert troops, equipment, and supplies into an objective area. Logistical airlift operations provide for planned resupply by air to deployed forces. This includes the movement of combat units, materiel, and personnel within theater in support of combat operations.[18]

Each area command, Air Force component command, must deploy to the theater of operations--if not already forward deployed there--and establish logistic pipelines needed to sustain its forces. In this case, it will establish uniservice support facilities and capabilities through its combat support and CSS elements similar to the USA component's to provide for supply, maintenance, engineering support, etc., as needed to sustain combat effectiveness consistent with CINC's concept of theater logistic support. In a manner somewhat similar to Navy reliance on support from MSC and Combat Logistic Forces (CLFs), the Air Force Component Commander (AFCC) relies on substantial integrated support from other USAF commands which may or may not be under the operational control of the CINC, i.e., USAFACC and AMC, in order to provide sustained logistic support to its deployed forces. Under such circumstances, the AFCC identifies to the theater CINC those logistic support requirements which supporting CINCs must provide. The CINC may direct the AFCC to provide unified command-wide common, joint, and/or cross-service logistic support for aeromedical evacuation; airborne and ground aircraft refueling services; in-theater air transport services (including transporting people and

materiel); morale services; food services; graves registration services; air terminal operations; etc. Some of these support services may also be provided to allied and/or coalition forces in theater at the CINC's direction.

U. S. Navy Component. The Navy Component Commander (NCC) provides the CINC a substantial array of combatant and non-combatant forces used as necessary to logistically sustain combat operations. The USN component's seabased units are provided theater logistic support primarily from CLF ships assigned to the NCC. Some high-priority air cargo may be airdropped to seaborne units by USAF component forces as well as from USN seabased and shorebased air assets assigned to the NCC. Shorebased USN units in theater are supported in the same manner as other military Services' landbased forces--through uniservicing, cross-servicing, common-servicing, and/or joint-servicing.

Combatant ships operate with a high degree of logistic independence because they are able to carry large quantities of combat consumables, have good sea-keeping qualities, and are able to steam long distances without refueling stops. Some combatant ships are used to provide transport and resupply support for amphibious landing forces and landbased forces of other military Services. They are sometimes used as safe haven evacuation platforms for extricated combatants and non-combatants--U.S. and friendly foreign nationals--in the theater. Combatant ships are sustained at sea through the employment of naval vessels categorized as auxiliary ships and referred to as CLF ships. The CLF ships operate in the open ocean in

a variety of sea states to provide underway replenishment, direct materiel support, maintenance, repair, and general support to deployed units, combat forces, and/or shorebased establishments. They include oilers; ammunition ships; combat stores ships; hospital ships; repair vessels; towing, salvage, rescue, special project and other such specialized non-combatant ships.[19]

In forward areas, CLF ships supply the materiel for war to all other forces afloat, as well as to the bases which they build and maintain. They are equipped to replenish combatant units underway with fuel (POL), ammunition, food, general supplies, components and spare parts. They also provide hospital services to forward deployed military personnel stationed afloat or ashore as well as provide maintenance and repairs to afloat units at forward operating bases and anchorages.[20] These CLF ships draw their resupply from commercial tankers and MSC ships at sea and from forward based supply depots ashore (sea terminals)--sources sustained through strategic lift (air and/or sea). Sea terminal operations may be operated solely by naval forces, Army forces, or may be operated jointly.

U. S. Marine Corps Component. The Marine Corps component operates as a part of naval forces when at sea and independently, to the extent required, when operating ashore. When the Marine Corps component is ashore, it is a self-contained operating unit in the same sense that the USA component operates as such. The Marine Corps' operational logisticians focus on maintaining and moving the operating forces on a sustained basis in war to the extent needed to form, equip, sustain, move, engage, disengage, and disestablish its forces.

CSS is a part of and uses as its foundation the overall operational logistics system. It includes but is not limited to administrative services, chaplain services, civil affairs, finance, legal service, health services, military police, supply, maintenance, transportation, construction, troop construction, acquisition and disposal of real property, facilities engineering, topographic and geodetic engineering functions, food service, graves registration, laundry, dry cleaning, bath, property disposal, and other logistic services.[21]

Although the CINC coordinates logistics to ensure military effectiveness, he also has the authority to coordinate the support of the Service components and to control distribution of support when shortages occur. The most common type of support for the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is uniservice support. The MAGTF commander and his staff is primarily concerned with the strategic timing of CSS at the theater logistics level. Fixed installations are the source of most CSS for the MAGTF. These installations are physical locations either aboard ship or on the ground. Their number and location are dictated by the concept of CSS which, in turn, is based on the MAGTF mission and concept of operations. Major types of CSS installations ashore include the following. Force Combat Service Support Area (FCSS): is established at the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) level, is in close proximity to a beach, seaport, and/or an airfield and is used to provide support to other CSS installations. Combat Service Support Area (CSSA): is a forward support installation having less than full CSS capabilities. Repair and Replenishment Point (RRP): supports mechanized forces or other rapidly moving forces and may be a

preestablished point or a hastily selected point to rearm, refuel, or provide repair services. Beach Support Area (BSA): is normally one of the first CSS installations established ashore during amphibious operations; it includes the full spectrum of CSS functions; it may be subsequently disestablished or may be the only CSS installation ashore. Landing Zone Support Area (LZSA): supports assault elements inserted by helicopter and most often is a short term installation with limited capabilities.[22]

CHAPTER III

INTEGRATED THEATER LOGISTIC SUPPORT

WHAT THE UNIFIED COMMANDER FACES. The diversity of Service capabilities is the source of the enormous challenge the CINC faces in integrating logistic support in the AOR to be able to transition smoothly from peacetime to wartime. "The more I see of war, the more I realize how it all depends on administration and transportation. ...It takes little skill or imagination to see where you would like your army to be and when; it takes much knowledge and hard work to know where you can place your forces and whether you can maintain them there. A real knowledge of supply and movement factors must be the basis of every leader's plan; only then can he know how and when to take risks with those factors, and battles are won only by taking risks."[1] This enlightened statement describes the mental environment wherein the CINC faces his most difficult task--ensuring combat operations do not fail to achieve the objective as a consequence of

want for that synonymous "nail."

There is extreme danger in the hubristic manner in which the military Services, National Command Authority, Congress, and american people continue to evaluate and assess the outcome of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Many logistic planners, probably the majority, recognize that danger. Nevertheless, the conjunctional influences of the collapse of the Soviet threat and our inability to specifically identify another threat of such credibility act to encourage complacency and assuage any fear of doing so. How often is talk of the success, power and prestige of US military forces attendant to the Gulf War heard within military circles? How often is the obvious discussed and what is being done to counter it? The obvious is the fact that tremendously favorable factors aided the success and resource limiting aspects of the Gulf War. Those factors are by no means guaranteed the next time a Desert Shield/Storm size operation is necessitated. For this reason, the CINC faces the probable adverse impact of such circumstances on the logistics involved in the next major operation. It is now time to act to overcome them.

WHAT THE UNIFIED COMMANDER CAN DO. Unified commands can plan, train, and operate now in a way that obviates predictable adverse impacts described above. Planning under the umbrella of contingencies in today's security environment, the CINC can consider the possibility that the next major operation may be under quite different circumstances. Theater foreign governments, for whatever reason, may not be as supportive as they were during the Gulf War. The next

adversary may not be as cooperative, as lacking in initiative, and as easy to isolate politically or on the battle field. Such a situational change could bring with it several adverse consequences affecting the sustainability and effectiveness of logistic support. The discussion that follows identifies not the least of them and is certainly not all inclusive.

* Logistic LOCs may be lengthened and/or threatened which will place greater demand on limited and declining materiel and transportation resources in order to keep the pipeline full. Loss or delay of delivery of certain critical spares or war reserve materials can have a profound negative impact on plan execution.

* In-theater facilities may be limited in size and location by the influences of weather, topography and territory occupied. This can limit throughput, stress the management of material flow in the pipeline, and require more attention to the prioritized movement of support to the theater.

* Infrastructure such as roads, railroads, bridges, etc., and off-road trafficability may be inadequate which again can congest and limit facility throughput and impede in-theater distribution. Buildings, telecommunications, utilities, and other structures may be non-existent, uninhabitable, inoperable, and/or unreliable, thus increasing the required amount of materiel import and throughput.

* The area in which airheads, beachheads, and other terminals and depots are established may be occupied by hostiles or may be an area of political and/or social unrest, thereby restricting and/or constraining the construction and operation of these facilities. The

CINC faces the prospects of the possible loss of operational capability, facilities, and stores as a result of hostile acts against them. This can be countered by increased security, facility dispersal, reduced quantities on-hand, or a combination thereof. Each of these possibilities also brings with it certain disadvantages which can have negative implications for logistic support effectiveness.

* Resources such as POL, water, and provisions may not be available locally or local sources may be unreliable, necessitating import or local production of these products. Shortages and/or ineffective distribution, or lack of visibility of any of these products can be an obstacle to operational initiative and stifle the CINC's ability to take advantage of enemy vulnerabilities.

* The war may be longer and conflict between enemy and friendly forces more intense, which would likely increase the expenditure of resources and demand for replenishment. Such requirements can exacerbate the aforementioned difficulties and make prioritizing and controlling the use and movement of resources an even more critical activity.

THE INTEGRATION CHALLENGE. These aforestated factors are cited to emphasize the challenge the CINC faces in trying to ensure the adequacy of sustainable, effective, and survivable logistic support capability, capacity, and organization. In the Gulf War, the CINC had not only the time to consider and plan for needs, the CINC, in most cases, also had the resources and facilities to duplicate many of the ammunition and materiel needs of the forces employed. The CINC should question whether this will be the case in the future. For many

reasons, including greater reliance on crisis response, current reductions in military budgets and forces, and a declining industrial base from which to draw support, CINCs can reasonably predict that future plans for and demands on resources must be more exacting and that the window for responding to the next crisis will be much smaller. These portents highlight the importance of a more critical and honest assessment and evaluation of the overall Gulf War logistic support plan as well as the plans of Service components. This review must be founded on generally accepted procedures for analysis and the methodology and measurements must be practical, valid, and reliable. The CINC must look at the facts and attempt to extrapolate the consequences of a more lengthy war, one with greater exchange of fire power, and one waged in a less favorable political and social environment.

Although the CINC can postulate the unlikelihood of the aforementioned adverse factors, to totally ignore them could be a costly and unforgivable mistake. For the foreseeable future, the Services will be competing for the same dollar in an environment of declining resources. Considering this fact in conjunction with the increased emphasis on adaptive planning for joint, contingency operations, the DOD must develop and implement new ways of doing old things. The military must face the irrefutable fact that now is the time to think what has heretofore been termed unthinkable. Peacetime is the time to think and operate in a fully integrated logistic support mode at the unified command level. In this regard, it is time to increase the peacetime involvement and directive authority of CINCs

in determining and directing how Service components are logistically supported at all times once assigned to the unified command. The CINC must be able to dictate Service component support tasks and use the resources assigned through the development and execution of generic contingency plans and standard operating procedures. Forces permanently assigned ashore which will operate from that theater location under all contingencies should be permanently integrated in peacetime in the way they will operate in wartime. The net result should be the diminution of strain on shrinking resources and the enhanced use and application of available logistic support forces for maximum, sustained combat effectiveness.

CINCs must be able to achieve the most effective budgetary prioritization of needs in the AOR and have forces that have been trained and routinely operated in the way they will operate in wartime. The CINC must be able to experiment with new concepts in order to ensure Service components incorporate specific, operationally sound, peacetime operating procedures and doctrine that are wholly or modularly transferrable to meet combatant needs in wartime. It is here where primary changes to previous modus operandi must be made. In order to do this, funding between logistic support programs at the unified command level must be fungible. This will necessitate a change in how Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding is allocated to Service components. Rather than direct allocation to the Service components, this funding must be allocated to and controlled by the CINC--Service components receiving their Operating Budgets from the CINC rather than through Service channels. This will permit the CINC

to adjust the execution of Service logistic support programs within the AOR during the budget year by reprioritizing and reallocating funding to correct current readiness or operational deficiencies across Service lines by consolidating, integrating, or redirecting resources as required. This will put the CINC in a position at the outset to be better prepared, organizationally and administratively, to logistically support forecasted or unforeseen contingency operations.

It is time to institutionalize rather than improvise common-service, cross-service, and joint logistic support operations. Institutionalizing these aspects of logistic support in peacetime can serve to expand the buying power of the total DOD budget by eliminating duplication of personnel and facility needs as well as avoiding unwarranted repetition of demand for the same materiel resources in the AOR. Consolidation and peacetime integration and operation of logistic assets across Service lines can also serve to reduce sealift and airlift mobilization requirements by preselecting personnel, facility, and or support needs at the theater level during peacetime so as to accelerate the decision making process when transitioning to wartime. Further, requiring services to provide cross-service, common-service, and joint logistic support as a matter of routine will serve to enhance interoperability and the familiarity of all Service components with wartime procedures and guidelines ahead of participating in contingency operations. This is the continuum of the idea of training in peacetime in the way one plans to fight in wartime. Moreover, the CINC's capacity to organize and

authoritatively direct assigned support forces and resources in peacetime will facilitate integrated accounting, visibility, and control of all theater resources at the theater level. From this, the CINC will be better able to determine and prioritize wartime requirements for and movement of resources to and within the theater thereby avoiding unnecessary, ineffective, or duplicitous demands on and management of logistic support resources (people, ammunition, POL, materiel, sealift, airlift, etc.).

Of course the Services, at the Headquarters level, will find this change a further erosion of their control over scarce Service resources as long as they are required to compete individually for their needs. Notwithstanding, the case for Services controlling the purse strings was better made when Service Chiefs had more direct involvement in the war effort. Following the Goldwater-Nichols Act, this unwarranted control is one of the last vestiges of those aspects of DOD organization and administration that impedes the movement toward jointness. This idea of fungible money actually envisions the blending of service O&M funding at the CINC level into "purple" dollars, thereby increasing the CINC'S flexibility and effectiveness in carrying out peacetime missions and in preparing for and executing Operations(s) Plans (OPLANs) when called on to do so. This means the CINC will have the capability when the impetus arises to resolve intratheater funding deficiencies from within all O&M funds available. Surge, crisis response or mobilization requirements can then be better defined, planned for and controlled beforehand, therefore enhancing responsiveness.

The bureaucracy of execution must be further decentralized for the purpose of meeting the objectives of warfighting CINCs, sometimes in difference to Service objectives. Parochialism will be further eroded while moving further into the camp of jointness. The old adage of "the mind is where the heart is" will be circumvented by the new adage of "the heart is where the purse is." Service doctrine must therefore be fully supportive of the CINCs concept of operations as driven by the peculiarities of the theater in which operational contingencies are contemplated.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

The CINC is challenged to organize, direct, and utilize forces assigned to the unified command in the way that best assures successful accomplishment of missions and tasks assigned. To do so, the CINC must ensure the forces provide theater logistic support during wartime in a manner sufficient to maximize sustained combat effectiveness. Each of the Service components in the unified command offers the CINC a vast array of capabilities which, when properly integrated, enhances overall support effectiveness while minimizing the logistic support tail. However, today the CINC must operate under peacetime command and control constraints which hamper the smooth transition of logistic support forces to a wartime footing. Facing the additional strictures of declining budgets and reductions in forces assigned, these constraints on the CINC's peacetime control of resources must be removed. The primary change that must occur to

provide the CINC the freedom to organize in peacetime to fight in wartime is control of the purse. Operation and Maintenance funding must be allocated to the CINC instead of directly to Service components under the CINC. Concurrently, the CINC must be given the same authoritative directive authority in peacetime as is provided for in wartime. These two major changes will provide the CINC the best capacity and opportunity to prepare for and rapidly respond to prospective or unforeseen crises in the AOR. In doing so, the CINC will also be able to reduce overall resource requirements in theater by peacetime consolidation and integration of forces on the basis of how they will operate in wartime, thereby eliminating much of the duplicative, inefficient, or unnecessary demand on the logistic support system.

NOTES

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